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We present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in
insurance markets. We begin by using this framework to review the “textbook” adverse selection environment
and its implications for insurance allocation, social welfare, and public policy. We then discuss several
important extensions to this classical treatment that are necessitated by important real world features
of insurance markets and which can be easily incorporated in the basic framework. Finally, we use
the same graphical approach to discuss the intuition behind recently developed empirical methods
for testing for the existence of selection and examining its welfare consequences. We conclude by
discussing some important issues that are not well-handled by this framework and which, perhaps















From the large scale social insurance programs of Social Security and Medicare to the heavily 
regulated private markets for property and casualty insurance, government intervention in insurance 
markets is ubiquitous. The fundamental theoretical reason for such intervention, based on classic work 
from the 1970s, is the problem of adverse selection. But despite the age and influence of the theory, 
systematic empirical examination of selection in actual insurance markets is a relatively recent 
development. Indeed, in awarding the 2001 Nobel Prize for the pioneering theoretical work on 
asymmetric information, the Nobel committee noted this paucity of empirical work (Bank of Sweden, 
2001). 
Over the last decade, however, empirical work on selection in insurance markets has gained 
considerable momentum, and a fairly extensive (and still growing) empirical literature on the topic has 
emerged. This research has found that adverse selection exists in some insurance markets but not in 
others. It has also uncovered examples of markets that exhibit “advantageous selection” – a phenomenon 
not considered by the original theory and that has different consequences for equilibrium insurance 
allocation and optimal public policy than the classical case of adverse selection. Researchers have also 
taken steps toward estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential public 
policy interventions. 
In this essay, we present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work 
on selection in insurance markets. This graphical approach, which draws heavily on Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Cullen (2010), provides both a useful and intuitive depiction of the basic theory of selection and its 
implications for welfare and public policy, as well as a lens through which one can understand the ideas 
and limitations of existing empirical work on this topic. 
We begin by using this framework to review the “textbook” adverse selection environment and its 
implications for insurance allocation, social welfare, and public policy. We then discuss several important 
extensions to this classic treatment that are necessitated by important real world features of insurance 
markets, and which can be easily incorporated in the basic framework. Finally, we use the same graphical 
  2approach to discuss the intuition behind recently developed empirical methods for testing for the 
existence of selection and examining its welfare consequences. We conclude by discussing some 
important issues that are not well-handled by this framework and which, perhaps not unrelatedly, have 
been little addressed by the existing empirical work; we consider these fruitful areas for additional 
research. Our essay does not aim at reviewing the burgeoning empirical literature on selection in 
insurance markets. However, at relevant points in our discussion we point the interested reader to recent 
papers that review or summarize recent findings. 
 
Adverse and Advantageous Selection: A Graphical Framework 
 
The Textbook Environment for Insurance Markets 
We start by considering the textbook case of insurance demand and cost, in which perfectly 
competitive, risk-neutral firms offer a single insurance contract that covers some probabilistic loss, risk-
averse individuals differ only in their (privately-known) probability of incurring that loss, and there are no 
other frictions in providing insurance such as administrative or claim-processing costs. Thus, more in the 
spirit of Akerlof (1970) and unlike the well known environment of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), firms 
compete in prices but do not compete on the coverage features of the insurance contract. We return to this 
important simplifying assumption in the end of this essay.  
Figure 1 provides our graphical representation of this case, and illustrates the resulting adverse 
selection as well as its consequences for insurance coverage and welfare. The figure considers the market 
for a specific insurance contract. Consumers in this market make a binary choice of whether or not to 
purchase this contract, and firms in this market compete only over what price to charge for the contract.  
The vertical axis indicates the price (and expected cost) of that contract, and the horizontal axis 
indicates the quantity of insurance demand. Since individuals face a binary choice of whether or not to 
purchase the contract, the “quantity” of insurance is simply the fraction of insured individuals. With risk- 
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providing insurance are the expected insurance claims—that is, the expected payouts on policies. 
Figure 1 shows the market demand curve for the insurance contract. Because individuals in this 
setting can only choose the contract or not, the market demand curve simply reflects the cumulative 
distribution of individuals’ willingness to pay for the contract. While this is a standard unit demand model 
that could apply to many traditional product markets, the textbook insurance context allows us to link 
willingness to pay to cost. In particular, a risk averse individual’s willingness to pay for insurance is the 
sum of her expected cost and her risk premium. 
In the textbook environment, individuals are homogeneous in their risk aversion (and all other 
features of their utility function). Therefore, their willingness to pay for insurance is increasing in their 
risk type—that is, their probability of loss, or expected cost—which is privately known. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1 by plotting the marginal cost (MC) curve as downward sloping: those individuals who are 
willing to pay the most for coverage are those that have the highest expected cost. This downward sloping 
MC curve represents the well-known adverse selection property of insurance markets: the individuals 
who have the highest willingness to pay for insurance are those who are expected to be the most costly for 
the firm to cover. 
The link between the demand and cost curve is arguably the most important distinction of 
insurance markets (or selection markets more generally) from traditional product markets. The shape of 
the cost curve is driven by the demand-side customer selection. In most other contexts, the demand curve 
and cost curve are independent objects; demand is determined by preferences and costs by the production 
technology. The distinguishing feature of selection markets is that the demand and cost curves are tightly 
linked since the individual’s risk type not only affects demand but also directly determines cost. 
The risk premium is shown graphically in the figure as the vertical distance between expected 
cost (the MC curve) and the willingness to pay for insurance (the demand curve). In the textbook case, the 
risk premium is always positive, since all individuals are risk-averse and there are no other market 
frictions. As a result, the demand curve is always above the MC curve and it is therefore efficient for all 
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individual is simply the risk premium of that individual, or the vertical difference between the demand 
and MC curves. 
When the individual-specific loss probability (or expected cost) is private information to the 
individual, firms must offer a single price for pools of observationally identical, but in fact heterogeneous, 
individuals. Of course, in practice firms may vary the price based on some observable individual 
characteristics (such as age or zip code). Thus, Figure 1 can be thought of as depicting the 
market for coverage among individuals who are treated identically by the firm.  
The competitive equilibrium price will be equal to firms’ average cost at that price. This is a zero 
profit condition; offering a lower price will result in negative profits, and offering higher prices than 
competitors will not attract any buyers. The relevant cost curve the firm faces is therefore the average cost 
(AC) curve, which is also shown in Figure 1. The (competitive) equilibrium price and quantity is given by 
the intersection of the demand curve and the AC curve (point C). 
The fundamental inefficiency created by adverse selection arises because the efficient allocation 
is determined by the relationship between marginal cost and demand, but the equilibrium allocation is 
determined by the relationship between average  cost and demand. Because of adverse selection 
(downward sloping MC curve), the marginal buyer is always associated with a lower expected cost than 
that of infra-marginal buyers. Therefore, as drawn in Figure 1, the AC curve always lies above the MC 
curve and intersects the demand curve at a quantity lower than Qmax. As a result, the equilibrium quantity 
of insurance will be less than the efficient quantity (Qmax) and the equilibrium price will be above the 
efficient price, illustrating the classical result of under-insurance in the presence of adverse selection 
(Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). That is, it is efficient to insure every individual (MC is 
always below demand) but in equilibrium the Qmax – Qeqm individuals with the lowest expected costs 
remain uninsured because the AC curve is not always below the demand curve. These individuals value 
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even.  
The welfare cost of this under-insurance depends on the lost surplus (the risk premium) of those 
individuals who remain inefficiently uninsured in the competitive equilibrium. In Figure 1, these are the 
individuals whose willingness to pay is less than the equilibrium price, Peqm. Integrating over all these 
individuals’ risk premia, the welfare loss from adverse selection in this simple framework is given by the 
area of the “dead-weight loss” trapezoid CDEF.  
Even in the textbook environment, the amount of under-insurance generated by adverse selection, 
and its associated welfare loss, can vary greatly. Figure 2 illustrates this point by depicting two specific 
examples of the textbook adverse selection environment, one that produces the efficient insurance 
allocation and one that produces complete unraveling of insurance coverage. The efficient outcome is 
depicted in Panel (a). While the market is adversely selected (that is, the MC curve is downward sloping), 
the AC curve always lies below the demand curve. This leads to an equilibrium price Peqm, that, although 
it is higher than marginal cost, still produces the efficient allocation (Qeqm = Qeff = Qmax). This situation 
can arise, for example, when individuals do not vary too much in their unobserved risk (that is, the MC  
and consequently AC curve is relatively flat) and/or individuals’ risk aversion is high (that is, the demand 
curve lies well above the MC curve). 
The case of complete unraveling is illustrated in Panel (b). Here, the AC curve always lies above 
the demand curve even though the MC curve is always below it.
 1 As a result, the competitive equilibrium 
is that no individual in the market is insured, while the efficient outcome is for everyone to have 
insurance. One could also use Panel (b) to illustrate the potential death spiral dynamics that may lead to 
such unraveling. For example, if insurance pricing is naively set but dynamically adjusted to reflect the 
average cost from the previous period (which is, in fact, a fairly common practice in many health 
insurance settings), the market will gradually shrink until it would unravel. This convergent adjustment 
                                                 
1 This can happen even within the textbook example if the individuals with the greatest risk are certain to incur a 
loss (in which case their risk premium is zero and their willingness to pay is the same as their expected costs).  
  6process is illustrated by the arrows in Panel (b). Cutler and Reber (1998) provide an empirical case study 
of a death spiral of this nature in the context of a health insurance plan offered to Harvard University 
employees.  
  
Public Policy in the Textbook Case  
Our graphical framework can also be used to illustrate the consequences of common public policy 
interventions in insurance markets. The canonical solution to the inefficiency created by adverse selection 
is to mandate that everyone purchase insurance. In the textbook setting, this produces the efficient 
outcome in which everyone has insurance. However, the magnitude of the welfare benefit produced by an 
insurance purchase requirement can vary dramatically depending on the specifics of the market. The two 
extreme examples presented in Figure 2 illustrate this point, but even in intermediate cases captured by 
Figure 1 the magnitude of the welfare loss (area CDEF) is highly sensitive to the shape and location of the 
cost and demand curves and is therefore ultimately an empirical question.
2  
Another commonly discussed policy remedy for adverse selection is to subsidize insurance 
coverage. We can use Figure 1 to illustrate. Consider, for example, a lump sum subsidy toward the price 
of coverage. This would shift demand out, leading to a higher equilibrium quantity and less under-
insurance. The welfare loss would still be associated with the area between the original (pre-subsidy) 
demand curve and the MC curve, and would therefore unambiguously decline with any positive subsidy. 
A large enough subsidy (greater than the line segment GE in Figure 1) would lead to the efficient 
outcome, with everybody insured. 
A final common form of public policy intervention is regulation that imposes restrictions on the 
characteristics of consumers over which firms can price discriminate. Some regulations require 
“community rates” that are uniform across all individuals, while others prohibit insurance companies 
from making prices contingent on certain observable risk factors, such as race or gender. For 
                                                 
2 Although in the specific examples in Figure 2 the welfare cost of adverse selection is increasing in the amount of 
underinsurance it creates, this does not have to be the case in general.  
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Figure 1 can be interpreted as applying to a group of individuals who must be treated the same by the 
insurance company. When pricing based on gender is prohibited, males and females are pooled into the 
same market, with a variant of Figure 1 describing that market. When pricing on gender is allowed, there 
are now two distinct insurance market – described by two distinct variants of Figure 1 – one for women 
and one for men, each of which can be analyzed separately. A central issue for welfare analysis is 
whether, when insurance companies are allowed to price on gender, consumers still have residual private 
information about their expected costs. If they do not, then the insurance market within each gender-
specific segment of the market will exhibit a constant (flat) MC curve, and the equilibrium in each market 
will be efficient. In this case, policies that restrict pricing on gender are unambiguously welfare 
decreasing since they create adverse selection where none existed before. However, in the more likely 
case that individuals have some residual private information about their risk that is not captured by their 
gender, each gender-specific market segment would look qualitatively the same as Figure 1 (with 
downward sloping MC and AC curves). In such cases, the welfare implications of restricting pricing on 
gender could go in either direction; depending on the shape and position of the gender-specific demand 
and cost curves relative to the gender-pooled ones, the sum of the areas of the “deadweight loss” 
trapezoids in the gender-specific markets could be larger or smaller than the area of the single deadweight 
loss trapezoid in the gender-pooled market.
3 
 
Departures from the Textbook Environment 
                                                 
3 A simple example illustrates how pricing on gender can increase deadweight loss. Consider three types of 
individuals. Type 1 individuals (representing 10% of the population) have expected cost of 20 and willingness-to-
pay for insurance of 30. Type 2 individuals (60%) have expected cost of 5 and willingness-to-pay of 20, and type 3 
(30%) have expected cost of 4 and willingness-to-pay of 7.5. The competitive (zero-profit) price in this market is 
6.2, leading to an efficient allocation in which everyone is insured (this case is similar to that of Panel (a) in Figure 
2). Suppose now that type 2 individuals are all females and type 1 and 3 individuals are all males, and gender can be 
priced. In this case, the competitive price for women is 5 and they are all insured. However, the competitive price 
for men is 8, leaving all type 3 individuals inefficiently uninsured. 
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magnitudes of the welfare costs arising from adverse selection, the qualitative findings are robust. Under 
the textbook assumptions, private information about risk always produces under-insurance relative to the 
efficient outcome, and mandatory insurance coverage is always a welfare-improving policy intervention. 
However, these robust qualitative results only hold in this textbook case. They may be reversed with the 
introduction of either or both of two important features of actual insurance markets: 1) insurance “loads” 
or administrative costs of providing insurance, and 2) preference heterogeneity.  
  Consider first a loading factor on insurance, for example in the form of additional administrative 
cost associated with selling and servicing insurance, perhaps due to costs associated with advertising and 
marketing, or with verifying and processing claims. Many insurance markets display evidence of non-
trivial loading factors, including long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), annuity markets 
(Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002), health insurance 
(Newhouse, 2002), and automobile insurance (Chiappori et al., 2006).
4 
The key implication of such loads is that it is now not necessarily efficient to allocate insurance 
coverage to all individuals. Even if all individuals are risk averse, the additional cost of providing an 
individual with insurance may be greater than the risk premium for certain individuals, making it socially 
efficient to leave such individuals uninsured. This case is illustrated in Figure 3, which is similar to Figure 
1, except that the cost curves are shifted upward reflecting the additional cost of insurance provision.
5 
Figure 3 is drawn in a way that the MC curve crosses the demand curve “internally” (that is, at a 
quantity lower than Qmax), at point E, which depicts the socially efficient insurance allocation. It is 
efficient to insure everyone to the left of point E (since their willingness to pay for insurance exceeds their 
                                                 
4 Admittedly, most of these papers lack the data to distinguish between loading factors arising from administrative 
costs to the insurance company and those arising from market power (insurance company profits). Still, it seems a 
reasonable assumption that it is not costless to run an insurance company. 
 
5 We note that Figure 3 could also describe a market with no frictions, but in which a fraction of the individuals are 
risk loving.  
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pay is less than their expected cost. In this situation, it’s efficient to keep Qmax – Qeff individuals uninsured. 
The introduction of loads does not affect the basic analysis of adverse selection, but it does have 
important implications for its standard public policy remedies. The competitive equilibrium is still 
determined by the zero profit condition, or the intersection of the demand curve and the AC curve (point 
C in Figure 3), and in the presence of adverse selection (downward sloping MC curve) this leads to under-
insurance relative to the social optimum (Qeqm < Qeff), and to a familiar dead-weight loss triangle CDE. 
However, with insurance loads, the textbook result of an unambiguous welfare gain from 
mandatory coverage no longer obtains. As Figure 3 shows, while a mandate that everyone be insured 
“regains” the welfare loss associated with under-insurance (triangle CDE), it also leads to over-insurance 
by covering individuals whom it is socially inefficient to insure (that is, whose expected costs are above 
their willingness to pay). This latter effect leads to a welfare loss given by the area EGH in Figure 3. 
Therefore whether a mandate improves welfare over the competitive allocation depends on the relative 
sizes of triangles CDE and EGH; this is turn depends on the specific market’s demand and cost curves, 
and is therefore an empirical question.  
A second important feature of real-world insurance markets not captured by the textbook 
treatment is preference heterogeneity: that is, the possibility that individuals may differ not only in their 
risk but also in their preferences, such as their willingness to bear risk (risk aversion). The classical 
models (like Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) make the simplifying and theoretically-attractive assumption 
that individuals have the same preferences, and may vary only in their (privately known) expected costs.  
As a result, willingness to pay for insurance is an increasing function of expected costs. 
In practice, of course, individuals may differ not only in their expected cost but also in their 
preferences. Indeed, recent empirical work has documented substantial preference heterogeneity in 
different insurance markets, including automobile insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007), reverse mortgages 
(Davidoff and Welke, 2007), health insurance (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008), and long-term care 
insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). The existence of unobserved preference heterogeneity opens 
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results just discussed.
6  
Consider for example heterogeneity in risk aversion, in addition to the original heterogeneity in 
risk (expected cost). All else equal, willingness-to-pay for insurance is increasing in risk aversion and in 
risk. If heterogeneity in risk aversion is small, or if those individuals who are high risk are also more risk 
averse, the main insights from the textbook analysis remain. But if high-risk individuals are less risk 
averse and the heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently large, advantageous selection may emerge. 
Namely, the individuals who are willing to pay the most for insurance are those who are the most risk 
averse, and in the case described these are also those individuals associated with the lowest (rather than 
the highest) expected cost. Indeed, it is natural to think that in many instances individuals who value 
insurance more may also take action to lower their expected costs: drive more carefully, invest in 
preventive health care, and so on. 
Figure 4 provides our graphical illustration of such advantageous selection and its consequences 
for insurance coverage and welfare. In contrast to adverse selection, advantageous selection is defined by 
an upward sloping MC (and AC) curve.
7 As price is lowered and more individuals opt into the market, 
the marginal individual opting in has higher expected cost than infra-marginal individuals. Since the MC 
curve is upward sloping, the AC curve will lie everywhere below it. If there were no insurance loads (as 
in the textbook situation), advantageous selection would not lead to any inefficiency; the MC and AC 
curves would always lie below the demand curve, and in equilibrium all individuals in the market would 
be covered, which would be efficient. 
                                                 
6 Another important (and more nuanced) aspect of preference heterogeneity is that it complicates the notion of 
efficiency. With preference heterogeneity, the mapping from expected cost to willingness-to-pay need no longer be 
unique. That is, two individuals with the same expected cost may have different valuations for the same coverage, or 
two individual with the same willingness to pay for the coverage may have different underlying expected costs. This 
possibility does not affect our earlier and subsequent analysis, except that one needs to recognize that it requires a 
weaker sense of efficiency. Specifically, it requires us to think of a constrained efficient allocation that maximize 
welfare subject to a uniform price. In such cases, the (constrained) efficient allocation need not coincide with the 
first-best allocation. Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2008) discuss and empirically analyze this issue in more detail. 
 
7 More generally, once we allow for preference heterogeneity, the marginal cost curve needs not be monotone. 
However, for simplicity and clarity we focus our discussion on the polar cases of monotone cost curves. 
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selection case, also leading to inefficiency, but this time due to over-insurance rather than under-
insurance. Figure 4 depicts this case. The efficient allocation calls for providing insurance to all 
individuals whose expected cost is lower than their willingness to pay—that is, all those who are to the 
left of point E (where the MC curve intersects the demand curve) in Figure 4. Competitive equilibrium, as 
before, is determined by the intersection of the AC curve and the demand curve (point C in Figure 4). But 
since the AC curve now lies below the MC curve, equilibrium implies that too many individuals are 
provided insurance, leading to over-insurance: there are Qeqm  – Qeff individuals who are inefficiently 
provided insurance in equilibrium. These individuals value the insurance at less than their expected costs, 
but competitive forces make firms reduce the price in order to attract these individuals and at the same 
time attracting more profitable infra-marginal individuals. Again, the area of the dead-weight loss triangle 
CDE quantifies the extent of the welfare loss from this over-insurance.  
From a public policy perspective, advantageous selection calls for the opposite solutions relative 
to the tools used to combat adverse selection. For example, given that advantageous selection produces 
“too much” insurance relative to the efficient outcome, public policies that tax existing insurance policies 
(and therefore raise Peqm  toward  Peff) or outlaw insurance coverage (mandate no coverage) could be 
welfare-improving. Although there are certainly taxes levied on insurance policies, to our knowledge 
advantageous selection has not yet been invoked as a rationale in public policy discourse, perhaps 
reflecting the relative newness of both the theoretical work and empirical evidence. To our knowledge, 
advantageous selection was first discussed by Hemenway (1990), who termed it “propitious” selection. 
De Meza and Webb (2001) provide a theoretical treatment of advantageous selection and its implications 
for insurance coverage and public policy. 
  
Advantageous selection is not merely a theoretical possibility. It has recently been documented in 
several insurance markets, with different sources of individual heterogeneity that give rise to it. 
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) document advantageous selection in the market for long-term care 
insurance and provide evidence that more cautious individuals invest more in precautionary behavior and 
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insurance. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) document advantageous selection in the market for Medi-
gap coverage, which provides private health insurance that supplements Medicare for the elderly, but 
show that in the case of Medi-gap, cognition may be the driving force: individuals with higher cognitive 
ability are often able to make better decisions, which can translate into both greater coverage and at the 
same time lower health care expenditures.  
Advantageous selection provides a nice example of the interplay in the selection literature 
between theory and empirical work. The original adverse selection theory motivated empirical work 
testing for the existence of adverse selection. This empirical work in turn provided examples of 
advantageous selection (which the original theory had precluded), suggesting the need for important 
extensions to the theory. We now turn to a more detailed discussion of how the existing empirical work 
can be viewed through the graphical framework we have developed. 
 
Empirical Work on Selection: A Graphical View  
 
Empirical research on selection in insurance markets has flourished over the last decade. This 
empirical literature began, quite naturally, by asking how we can test for whether the classic adverse 
selection models apply in real-world insurance markets. In other words, what would selection look like in 
the data, when or if it exists? Empirical research has now progressed from trying to detect the existence 
(and nature) of selection toward attempts to quantify its welfare consequences and those of potential 
public policy interventions. We can use our graphical framework to understand the intuition and 
limitations of this research program. 
 
“Positive Correlation” Tests For Adverse Selection 
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whether the MC curve is downward sloping. Making inference about marginal individuals is difficult, 
however. As a result, the early empirical approaches developed strategies that attempt to get around this 
difficulty by, instead, focusing on comparing averages. 
  The graphical depictions of adverse selection in Figure 1 (or Figure 3) suggests one way to 
examine whether adverse selection is present in a particular insurance market: compare the expected cost 
of those with insurance to the expected cost of those without (or compare those with more insurance 
coverage to those with less coverage).  
  To see this idea more clearly, consider Figure 5. Here we start with the adverse selection situation 
already depicted in Figure 3, denoting the AC curve shown in previous figures by ACinsured to reflect the 
fact that it averages over those individuals with insurance, and adding one more line: the ACuninsured curve. 
The ACuninsured curve represents the average expected cost of those individuals who do not have insurance. 
That is, the ACinsured curve is derived by averaging over the expected costs of the insured (averaging “from 
the left”, starting at Q = 0) while the ACuninsured curve is produced by averaging over the expected costs of 
the uninsured (averaging “from the right”, starting at Q = Qmax). A downward-sloping MC curve implies 
that ACinsured is always above ACuninsured, with the average costs of the insured at Qmax equal to the average 
costs of the uninsured at Q = 0 (because both represent the average costs of the full population), and the 
marginal cost curve intersecting ACinsured at Q = 0 and ACuninsured at Q = Qmax.  
Thus, at any given insurance price, and in particular at the equilibrium price, adverse selection 
implies that the average cost of insured individuals is higher than the average cost of uninsured, and the 
difference in these averages is given by line segment CF in Figure 5 (the thick arrowed line in the figure). 
This basic insight underlies the widely used “positive correlation” test for asymmetric information. The 
test measures the distance between point C (average costs of those who in equilibrium are insured) and 
point F (average costs of those who in equilibrium are not insured). The results are consistent with the 
existence of adverse selection if the average cost of the insured (point C) is statistically greater than those 
of the uninsured (point F). 
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individuals with different insurance coverage, controlling as needed for important confounding factors (as 
we discuss below). Many of these empirical papers use data from a single company, and examine average 
claims across individuals who are offered the same contracts but who choose more or less coverage. Our 
graphical framework naturally extends to the choice of more vs. less coverage (as opposed to any vs. no 
insurance). Indeed, the recent burgeoning of empirical work on selection likely reflects at least in part 
researchers’ increasing success in obtaining access to insurance company data, which has greatly 
improved their ability to examine questions of private information empirically.  
Perhaps due in part to its not-so-demanding data requirement, variants of the positive correlation 
test have been quite popular; the test requires “only” that one observe the average expected costs of 
individuals (who are observationally identical to the firm) with different amounts of insurance coverage. 
There is now a large literature studying how average costs vary across different coverage options in a 
broad range of insurance markets, including health, life, automobile, and homeowner insurance.  The 
results have been mixed. In some markets, researchers have found evidence consistent with adverse 
selection—that is, higher average costs for individuals with greater insurance coverage—while in others 
they have found evidence of advantageous selection—defined by a negative relationship between 
insurance coverage and average costs—or have been unable to reject the null of symmetric information, 
meaning no difference in average costs. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide a recent review of this 
literature.  
 
Challenges in Applying the Positive Correlation Test 
Although applying the simple positive correlation test is reasonably straightforward, one has to 
confront certain challenges. Researchers have generally been quite careful to acknowledge these issues 
and in some cases to find creative ways that get around them. We mention here three common issues that 
often come up in applications, again referring to our graphical framework for intuition. 
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individuals with and without insurance may confound adverse selection and moral hazard. Both adverse 
selection and moral hazard can generate a positive correlation between insurance coverage and claims, 
but these are two very different forms of asymmetric information with very different implications for 
public policy. With adverse selection, individuals who have private information that they are at higher 
risk self-select into the insurance market, generating the positive correlation between insurance coverage 
and observed claims. As already discussed, the government has several potential welfare-improving 
policy tools to possibly address such selection. With moral hazard, individuals are identical before they 
purchase insurance, but have incentives to behave differently after. Those with greater coverage have less 
incentive to take actions that reduce their expected costs, which will generate a relationship between 
insurance coverage and observed claims. Unlike in the case of adverse selection, the government typically 
has no advantage over the private sector at reducing the welfare costs of moral hazard. 
Figure 6 shows how moral hazard can produce the same “positive correlation” property as 
adverse selection produces in Figure 5. Specifically, Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of an 
insurance market with moral hazard but no selection. The lack of selection is captured by the flat MC 
curves. Moral hazard is captured by drawing two different MC curves, as opposed to the single MC curve 
we have drawn in the figures so far. The MCinsured curve represents the expected cost of insured 
individuals, and corresponds to the MC curves we have been drawing in all previous figures. The 
MCuninsured curve represents the expected cost of these same individuals, if they were uninsured. Moral 
hazard, which takes the form of greater expected costs when a given individual has insurance than when 
she does not, implies that MCinsured is greater than MCuninsured for each individual (or, graphically, point-by-
point).
8 The vertical difference between MCinsured and MCuninsured is a graphical way to quantify moral 
hazard in terms of expected cost. 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, we have drawn Figure 6 so that the MCuninsured curve is parallel to the MCinsured curve, thus assuming 
that the cost effect associated with moral hazard is homogeneous across individuals. The discussion would be the 
same for a richer situation, in which the moral hazard effect is heterogeneous (so that the vertical distance between 
the MCinsured and MCuninsured varies).  
  16Figure 6 is drawn for a case in which there is no adverse selection: individuals have the same 
expected cost, the MC curves are flat, and the demand curve is downward sloping due to other factors (for 
example, heterogeneity in risk aversion). Yet, a comparison of expected costs between the insureds and 
uninsureds would lead to the same quantity (line segment CF) as in Figure 5. However, while in Figure 5 
the positive correlation arose due to adverse selection, in Figure 6 this same positive correlation is 
generated entirely by moral hazard.
 9 
Therefore, in situations where moral hazard could be an important factor, the positive correlation 
test is a joint test of either adverse selection or moral hazard. Finding a positive correlation would reject 
the null (of symmetric information) either due to the presence of adverse selection or moral hazard (or 
both). Moreover, finding no correlation could be either due to no asymmetric information or due to the 
existence of both moral hazard and advantageous selection, which offset each other. On the other hand, a 
convincing finding of a negative correlation is still informative, as it would be consistent with 
advantageous selection, even in the presence of moral hazard.  
  A second important consideration in applying the positive correlation test is the set of covariates 
that are being conditioned out. As a starting point, one must condition on the consumer characteristics that 
determine the prices offered to each individual. That is, a proper implementation of the positive 
correlation test requires that we examine whether, among a set of individuals who are offered coverage 
options at identical prices, those who buy more insurance have higher expected costs than those who do 
not. In the absence of such conditioning, it is impossible to know whether a correlation arises due to 
demand (different individuals self select into different contracts) or supply (different individuals are 
offered the contracts at different prices by the insurance company). Only the former is evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
9 Naturally, one could consider an environment in which both selection and moral hazard were present. The issues 
and discussion would be similar; we focused on the extreme case to simplify the graphical presentation. In 
particular, with no selection (flat MC curves) we do not need to draw the corresponding AC curves since they are 
identical to the MC curves. In an environment with both selection (as shown by non-flat MC curves) and moral 
hazard (MCinsured >  MCuninsured) each MC curve would have a corresponding AC curve. As in Figure 5, ACinsured 
would be constructed by averaging “from the left” over the marginal costs of those with insurance (MCinsured), while 
ACuninsured would be constructed by averaging “from the right” over the marginal costs of those without insurance 
(MCuninsured).   
  17selection. As a result, some of the most convincing tests are those carried out using insurance company 
data, where the researcher knows (rather than assumes) the full set of characteristics that the insurance 
company uses for pricing. Absent data on individually-customized prices, which is sometimes difficult to 
obtain, one may instead try to flexibly control for all individual characteristics that affect pricing 
(Chiappori and Salanie, 2000). 
A yet more nuanced decision is whether one should control for a larger set of covariates (when 
available). In addition to the consumer characteristics that determine their choice set (that is, the specific 
contracts and their prices), one could attempt to control for other observed variables that are not used (due 
to regulation or any other reason), for other observable variables that are not observed by the firm (some 
may be observable to the firm with additional cost, others may be observable only to the researcher), and 
so on. Whether such variables should be used as covariate is less obvious and is likely to depend on the 
question that one would like to answer. One needs to recognize that the interpretation of a positive 
correlation can vary depending on such decision. For example, one may find positive correlation only 
because firms are not allowed to incorporate race into pricing. If this positive correlation disappears when 
race is controlled for, one may want to be careful about the precise meaning of the term “asymmetric 
information” (since race is known to the insurance company even if not used in pricing) even though the 
implications for market equilibrium and inefficiency may be the same.  
  A final important consideration in applying the test concerns the measurement of costs. Figure 5 
suggests that the theoretical object one would like to observe is that of expected cost. Expectations are, of 
course, difficult to observe, so researchers often use proxies for it. 
The most direct proxy would use the average realized costs. With enough data, realized costs of 
the insured converge to the expected costs, precisely capturing the theoretical object. In practice, 
however, realized costs may be tricky. For example, when comparing insured to uninsured individuals, 
one obviously does not observe the “claims” of the uninsured. Even when comparing claims of 
individuals who choose more or less coverage within a given company, certain realized (social) costs are 
less likely to be claimed by individuals with less coverage. For example, there is a range of possible claim 
  18amounts that are worth claiming under low deductible, but would not provide any benefits for (and are 
unlikely to be filed by) individuals covered by a higher deductible.  
There are several potential strategies for trying to detect differences in real behavior as opposed 
to differences in claiming behavior. One option is to focus on a subset of realized claims that are less 
prone to insurance coverage influencing decisions to file a claim: for example, by focusing on multiple-
car accidents in the context of automobile insurance. Alternatively, one might use data external to the 
firm: for example, by examining mortality certificates in the context of annuities or life insurance. The 
latter has the ancillary benefit that such “external” data are observed for the uninsured population as well.  
Another approach is to identify individual characteristics that are not priced by insurance 
companies but are known to be associated with expected cost, such as age or gender in the context of 
employer-provided health insurance. An ancillary benefit of this approach is that it also gets around the 
issue of moral hazard. A limitation of this approach, however, is that it can only be applied in situations in 
which – in conflict with textbook economics – pricing is not affected by an important risk factor. In such 
settings, one might reasonably wonder whether the original concerns about the efficiency loss from 
adverse selection and the potential public policy remedies are at all relevant. 
 
Beyond Testing: Quantifying Selection Effects 
The importance and influence of the seminal theoretical work on selection in insurance markets 
stemmed in large part from its findings that selection could impair the efficient operation of competitive 
insurance markets and potentially open up scope for welfare-improving government intervention. 
Detecting selection is therefore only a first step. If selection is empirically detected, it is natural to ask 
whether the welfare costs it generates are large or small, and what might be the welfare consequences of 
specific government policies. These are fundamentally empirical questions, and our graphical framework 
is useful for guiding attempts to quantify these welfare constructs. 
We begin by debunking a common (mis)perception that the very same empirical objects that are 
used for the positive correlation test (described earlier) can also be informative about the welfare costs 
  19associated with selection. It may be appealing to imagine that markets that appear “more adversely 
selected”—that is, ones in which there is a larger difference between the expected costs of insureds and 
uninsureds—experience greater welfare loss associated with that selection. Unfortunately, Figure 7 
illustrates that without additional assumptions, comparisons of expected costs are not that informative 
about underlying efficiency costs. Figure 7 starts with the situation depicted in Figure 3. Once again, the 
equilibrium difference in expected costs between the insureds and uninsureds is given by the distance 
between points C and F, and the welfare loss from adverse selection is given by the area of the 
deadweight loss triangle CDE. However, here we have drawn two possible demand curves, each of which 
give rise to the same equilibrium point (point C), while keeping the MC and AC curves unchanged.
 10,11 
By design, the two demand curves generate the same equilibrium point, thereby producing the same 
difference in expected costs between the insureds and uninsureds (line segment CF in Figure 7). 
However, these demand curves generate different efficient outcomes, meaning different points at which 
the two demand curves intersect the MC curve, denoted in the figure by points E1 and E2. As a result, they 
produce different-sized welfare losses, given by the corresponding triangles CDE1 and CDE2. This 
example thus illustrates how deadweight loss triangles of different sizes can be generated even though the 
“extent of adverse selection” as measured by the difference in average costs is the same. 
One way to make some progress in quantifying the welfare consequences of selection or of 
potential public policy is to use bounds which are based on easily observable objects. For example, 
suppose we would like to bound the welfare cost of selection. We use Figure 1 (adverse selection) for this 
discussion, but it is easy to imagine an analogous discussion for the advantageous selection shown in 
                                                 
10 As we emphasize throughout, the demand and cost curves are tightly linked. Thus, many changes in primitives 
will shift both demand and cost curves at the same time. It is still possible however to think of changes in the 
environment that could change demand without affecting the cost curves. For example, in the textbook case such 
changes would require preferences (but not loss probabilities) to change while preserving the ranking of willingness 
to pay for insurance across individuals. 
 
11 Linear demand curves (as in Figure 7) allow us to rotate the demand curve without altering the relationship 
between the MC curve and the AC curve. If demand was non-linear, changes to demand would have triggered shifts 
in the AC curve (holding the MC curve constant). The basic point that the welfare cost of adverse selection can vary 
across markets with the same difference in expected costs between the uninsured and insured would still apply, but 
the figure would be messier to draw. 
  20Figure 4. Suppose first that we observe only the price of the insurance sold in the market. If we are 
willing to assume that we observe the competitive equilibrium price (Peqm), we can obtain a (presumably 
not very tight) upper bound of the welfare cost of selection, given by Peqm × Qmax. Intuitively, because 
adverse selection leads to underinsurance the worst possible scenario is when nobody is insured but 
everybody should be insured. Since the equilibrium price must exceed the willingness-to-pay for 
insurance by the uninsureds (otherwise they would have purchased insurance), the price provides an 
upper bound on the per-individual welfare loss. 
Additional data may help tighten the bound. If we also observe the (equilibrium) share of 
uninsured individuals (that is, Qmax - Qeqm), the upper bound for the welfare loss can be tightened to Peqm 
(Qmax - Qeqm). Finally, if we also have all the data elements needed for the positive correlation test – so 
that we also observe the expected costs of the uninsureds and denote it by X – we can further tighten this 
upper bound to (Peqm – X) (Qmax - Qeqm) (equal to area CDFJ in Figure 1).
12 
Substantially more progress can be made in estimating the welfare consequences of selection (or 
of potential public policy interventions) if we have one additional data element beyond what is required 
for the positive correlation test. This additional element, which is so heavily used in other subfields of 
applied microeconomics, is identifying variation in insurance prices.
  
To see how useful price variation may be for welfare analysis, one can imagine the ideal 
experiment of randomly varying the price at which insurance is offered to large pools of otherwise 
identical individuals. For each pool, we would then observe the fraction of individuals who bought 
insurance and the average realized costs of insured individuals. In such an ideal situation, we can use the 
data generated to “trace out” the demand curve and the AC curve in our graphical analysis, and to derive 
                                                 
12 To see this, note that Peqm (Qmax - Qeqm) is equal to the area below line CJ, while X (Qmax - Qeqm) is equal to the area 
below line DF because X is the average value of the MC curve between Qeqm and Qmax.. 
 
  21the MC curve, thus producing the three essential curves behind all of the welfare analysis in our graphical 
framework.
 13 
Observing the MC curve arguably addresses the key challenge for empirically analyzing 
insurance markets which, as noted earlier, is to identify the marginal individuals. Indeed, with knowledge 
of the MC curve, AC curve, and demand curve, it is straightforward to compute the welfare loss of 
adverse selection or any other object of interest within the graphical framework we propose, such as the 
welfare effects of the various public policy interventions we analyzed earlier. This is the basic point 
advanced in Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010), who empirically illustrate this idea in the context of 
employer-provided health insurance. They also provide some discussion of possible sources of such 
identifying pricing variation, including field experiments, experimentation by firms, and pricing variation 
driven by various common forms of insurance regulation. 
Such pricing variation has two related ancillary benefits. First, it provides a direct test of both the 
existence and nature of selection based on the slope of the estimated MC curve. We can reject the null of 
symmetric information if we can reject the null of a constant MC curve. Moreover, a finding that the MC 
curve is downward (upward) sloping suggests the existence of adverse (advantageous) selection. 
Crucially, unlike the “positive correlation” test, this “cost curve” test of selection is not affected by the 
existence (or lack thereof) of moral hazard. To see why this is true, recall that the AC curve from which 
the MC curve is derived is defined as the average costs of all those individuals who buy a specific 
insurance contract. Because the cost curves are defined over a sample of individuals who all have the 
same insurance contract, differences in the shape of the cost curve are not directly affected by moral 
hazard.
 14  
                                                 
13 Note that the AC curve and the MC curve are linked through the demand curve, so that knowledge of two of the 
three curves allows us to back out the third. To see this, note that marginal costs at point p, MC(p), can be computed 
by evaluating the difference in total costs TC(p)-TC(p’) for p’ just above p, where TC(p) is simply the product of 
average cost AC(p) and demand Q(p). 
 
14 Of course, it is possible that the moral hazard effect of insurance is greater for some individuals than others and 
that, anticipating this, individuals whose behavior is more responsive to insurance may be more likely to buy 
  22This insight suggests a step-by-step approach to analysis of selection in insurance markets if one 
has access to identifying pricing variation, in addition to the data on average costs of those with different 
insurance coverage. In the first step, the simple correlation test can be used to see if one can reject the null 
of symmetric information (in favor of either a positive or negative correlation). In the second step, if the 
null of symmetric information is rejected, the identifying pricing variation can then be used to estimate 
the cost curves and thus detect whether selection—as distinct from moral hazard—exists and whether it is 
adverse or advantageous. Finally, if selection is detected, its welfare cost can be estimated, and the 
welfare consequences of potential public policy interventions weighed, by bringing the estimated demand 
curve into the analysis as well. 
There is yet another important benefit from identifying pricing variation, although it is not the 
focus of this essay, which is that it allows one to test for and quantify moral hazard. To see this, we can 
again consider what the ideal experiment might be. To analyze moral hazard, one would randomly 
allocate insurance to some individuals and allocate no insurance to others. But this is essentially the 
experiment generated by identifying pricing variation: those individuals who are assigned high prices are 
less likely to have insurance, while those who are assigned low prices are more likely to be insured. One 
can then test and quantify the moral hazard effect of insurance by projecting any observed behavior of 
interest on whether an individual is insured or not, using the identifying source of price variation as an 
instrument for insurance coverage. Moreover, one can go further and, instead of only quantifying the 
average moral hazard effect, use the estimated demand curve for insurance to quantify the heterogeneity 
of moral hazard as a function of the individual’s willingness to pay for insurance. Such analysis may 
address important questions that go well beyond the current state of the empirical literature on average 
moral hazard effects in insurance markets to examine whether high risk individuals are such because their 
underlying risk is higher—for example, because they are chronically ill—or because their behavioral 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurance. We would still view this as selection, however, in the sense that individuals are selecting insurance on the 
basis of their anticipated behavioral response to it.  
  23response to insurance is greater—for example, because they are deterred from seeing a doctor unless their 
out-of-pocket cost is sufficiently low. To our knowledge, this has not yet been investigated. 
Finally, we note that an attractive feature of our graphical framework is that it provides a 
transparent way to assess the relative contribution of the data and of any underlying theoretical or 
statistical assumptions in giving rise to the empirical estimates. An example may be useful. Consider 
Figure 3, and suppose we are interested in estimating the area of the deadweight loss triangle CDE. For 
this particular object of interest, we require estimates of the demand curve and cost curves at the range 
that is between Qeqmx and Qeff , while other parts of the curves are less important. A researcher who has 
excellent price variation that identifies the curves for infra-marginal buyers (to the left of Qeqmx) would 
need to rely heavily on theoretical or statistical assumptions to extrapolate the curves to the relevant 
region, and would need to perform robustness checks to evaluate  alternative models that may imply 
different extrapolations. In contrast, if the price variation spans the relevant region, sensitivity to 
modeling assumptions may be less of a concern.  
To the extent that more limited (or nonexistent) pricing variation requires greater modeling 
assumptions for the welfare analysis, one nice feature of insurance markets is that the theory underlying 
individual choices of insurance coverage is well developed and much tested (in the laboratory and in the 
field). Thus, this is a context where perhaps more than others, relying on theoretical restrictions may be 
quite credible. Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010) provide a recent review of modeling approaches to 




The graphical framework we have presented provides a unified approach for understanding both 
the conceptual welfare issues posed by selection in insurance markets and potential government 
intervention, as well as the existing empirical efforts to detect selection and measure its welfare 
  24consequences. However, this framework has abstracted from several constructs that are potentially of 
interest. Some are very easily handled by simple extensions of the framework, others much less so. 
We start with the easier issues. Although for expositional simplicity we focused on the binary 
choice of “whether or not to buy insurance,” the same graphical analysis can easily be applied to a choice 
between more or less coverage. It can also be used to analyze choices across more than two contracts, 
although a multi-dimensional graphical approach is less appealing. Finally, it is straightforward to relax 
our maintained assumption of perfectly competitive insurance markets – which in many markets may not 
bear much resemblance to reality. One could carry out a similar analysis using alternative pricing 
assumptions which lead to a different equilibrium point (instead of the average cost pricing arising from 
perfect competition). Welfare could then be analyzed by comparing the new equilibrium point with the 
efficient allocation, although of course now it must be recognized that any welfare cost conflates both 
those created by selection and those created by imperfect competition.  
A more difficult set of issues relates to the focus of the analysis on the pricing distortions arising 
from selection while abstracting from the possibility that selection can distort the set of insurance 
contracts that are offered. In other words, we have assumed that insurance companies compete over the 
price of a given set of insurance contracts. In practice, insurance companies also set the coverage features 
of the insurance contract (deductibles, covered events, and so on) and selection pressures may well affect 
the set of contract features offered in equilibrium.  Admittedly, abstracting from this potential 
consequence of selection may miss a substantial component of its welfare implications and may explain 
why most of the empirical work to date on the welfare costs of selection has tended to find relatively 
modest welfare effects. Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010) provide more discussion and description of 
this point. 
Allowing the contract space to be determined endogenously in a selection market raises 
challenges on both the theoretical and empirical front. On the theoretical front, we currently lack clear 
characterizations of the equilibrium in a market in which firms compete over contract dimensions as well 
as price, and in which consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information (like expected 
  25cost and risk preferences). From an empirical standpoint, the challenge is that if adverse selection greatly 
reduces the set of offered contracts, estimating the welfare loss from the contracts not offered may require 
the researcher to go quite far out of sample. While these challenges are far from trivial and may explain 
why there has been relatively little work of either type on this topic to date, we view this direction as an 
extremely important – and likely fruitful – topic for further research. As with the research to date on 
selection in insurance markets, we expect that there will be a useful complementarity between theoretical 
and empirical progress moving forward.  
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  30FIGURE 2: Specific Examples of extreme cases 
 
 































































































  35FIGURE 7: The “positive correlation” and its (non)relation to welfare costs of selection 
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